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Title: "**US Open to New Zealand's Return to ANZUS.**" The US remains receptive to New Zealand's return to the **ANZUS** alliance, according to an article by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon. (900314)

Text: 03/14/90 * **U.S. OPEN TO NEW ZEALAND'S RETURN TO ANZUS**

(Text: Solomon article printed in "the Dominion") (1450)

Washington — The United States remains receptive to New Zealand's return to the **ANZUS** alliance, according to an article written by Richard H. Solomon, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. In the article, Solomon notes that the March 1 meeting between Minister of External Affairs and Trade Mike Moore and Secretary of State James A. Baker III demonstrates American willingness to keep lines of communication open. But the U.S. ban on military, security, and intelligence cooperation with New Zealand will remain in effect until New Zealand accepts the American "neither confirm nor deny" policy and lifts its ban on port visitation by nuclear- powered and/or nuclear-armed warships. Port visitation rights, Solomon writes, are critical to the operations of the alliance. Following is the text of the Solomon article printed March 14 in "The Dominion" of New Zealand under the title, "New Zealand: Your Place at the Alliance Table Awaits": (begin text)

In his March 1 discussion with Minister for External Affairs and Trade Mike Moore, Secretary of State James A. Baker III explored a number of economic and social issues central to today's period of profound ferment in global affairs. Mr. Baker's meeting with Mr. Moore represented an adjustment in our limited contact policy intended to make clear that there are important issues of shared concern between the United States and New Zealand, and that an exchange of views between the Secretary of State and his counterpart may occur when it is helpful to both sides. The meeting was also intended to be an expression of hope that New Zealand will make the necessary adjustments in its defense policy that will enable it to return to the table of partnership in **ANZUS** — to rejoin former allies with whom it fought in four wars this century in pursuit of shared democratic values and common security. The priority which President Bush attaches to combatting drug trafficking, our common views on trade liberalization in the current Uruguay Round of the GATT, our concerns with the environment (as expressed in our cooperation last year at the U.N. on the issue of driftnet fishing), and efforts to enhance Asia/Pacific Economic Cooperation, were all compelling reasons to view Mr. Moore's presence in Washington as an opportunity to advance discussion on such issues of mutual interest. The Baker- Moore encounter, however, does not reflect any diminution in the depth of our concern about the fundamental security disagreement between Washington and Wellington, which continues to impede our return to a relationship of full confidence and cooperation. Secretary Baker made this clear in Congressional testimony and in the meeting with Mr. Moore. The recent dramatic advancements around the world — from Eastern Europe to South Africa — in political freedoms, in nuclear arms control, and now in conventional arms reduction, have been possible precisely because of the solidarity which the Western allies have maintained for four decades—despite calls by different groups for unilateral disarmament. It is always difficult for democratic societies to make hard choices on foreign policy and defense issues, but political leaders have the responsibility to provide the balanced judgment which such choices require. The epoch-making achievements of the past few years serve as powerful testimony to the importance of collective security and to the wisdom of Western leadership. It is to be regretted that New Zealand has absented itself from that collective leadership. The Baker-Moore meeting was a demonstration of the priority we attach to working cooperatively on issues of mutual concern with democratic friends. It was, however, also an opportunity to reaffirm the limits of such cooperation when a treaty ally adopts policies incompatible with its alliance commitments. Our ban on military, security, and intelligence cooperation with New Zealand will remain in effect, for the "neither confirm nor deny" policy continues to be critical to the maintenance of an effective defense capability. New Zealand's policy of banning nuclear-powered and/or nuclear-armed warships from its ports resulted in **ANZUS** being curtailed as an operational trilateral alliance. This was fully understood when specific ship access decisions were made and when New Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation was approved. The U.S. is not pro-nuclear, but pro-alliance and pro- security. Our alliance systems, and the benefits which flow from them, are based on a sharing of burdens and responsibilities — of which the United States has borne a disproportionate measure over the years. The foremost purpose of our global security commitments is to prevent war from ever occurring; and these commitments have been remarkably successful for more than four decades. The U.S. is also committed to pursuing arms control and reductions in the interest of maintaining a stable peace, and the major reductions or elimination of strategic and theater nuclear weapons in recent years attests both to the will to control and reduce weaponry to the lowest levels necessary for effective defense and to the powerful effect of alliance cohesion. **ANZUS** has played a vital role in helping to assure peace and stability in the Southwest Pacific, clearly benefiting New Zealand. Access to allied ports by U.S. vessels has made an important contribution to the flexibility and effectiveness of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific—and has helped to make deterrence credible.

Globally, **ANZUS** has been part of the Western alliance system which has been so effective in preventing war and creating the basis for substantial arms reductions. But alliances cannot survive if the security partners select their responsibilities "a la carte." Some look at the remarkable changes underway around the world—the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the transformation of the Soviet Union, the surge of democracy in the Philippines and South Korea—and conclude that alliances are no longer necessary. Such a conclusion could not be less warranted, nor more likely to undo the progress now evident in reducing East-West tensions. It was alliance solidarity, based on shared values and principles, which hastened the demise of communism, and which now provides the framework for a new structure of peace. In the uncertain transition period between two eras dangers to stability loom large, and in such times allies working in concert have a great opportunity to shape the emerging order of things. This is now true in Europe, and it is no less true in Asia. After a decade of unprecedented dynamism and relative stability, Asia is again in ferment. Uncertainty clouds China's future. A dangerous confrontation persists on the Korean peninsula. The Philippines continues to face perilous challenges. In the South Pacific, New Zealand's back yard, there is significant political uncertainty as small island states deal with the challenges of nationhood and economic survival in a fast-changing world. President Bush has said that our new enemies are instability, uncertainty, and unpredictability; and it is precisely in such an ambiguous security environment that the bonds uniting longstanding friends sharing common values acquire the greatest importance. It would be folly to forget that the firmness of deterrence is what has made possible dramatic successes in arms reduction. Holding to our position allowed the U.S. and the Soviets to reach agreement on the removal of all Soviet SS-20 missiles deployed in Soviet Asia. We are currently negotiating unprecedented major reductions in strategic weapons and conventional forces in Europe. In addition, President Bush has made serious proposals for eliminating the scourge of chemical weapons, an effort in which Australia has taken the lead in creating a new forum. And substantial progress has been made on protocols which will lead to ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty to curb nuclear testing. It is in this context that we hope that New Zealand will rethink its policies as to the most effective route to arms reductions and the construction of a more peaceful world. Ernest Hemingway once wrote that one should not confuse action with movement. It would be a mistake if anyone misinterpreted our willingness to discuss the many non-security matters of common concern as a softening of our position towards New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance. So long as New Zealand absents itself from the table of common defense, there will continue to be limits to our relationship and to New Zealand's influence on global affairs. We believe that New Zealand should take another look at its opportunity to contribute constructively to global stability and return to the **ANZUS** table, so that it can participate fully in the exciting challenge of reshaping international relationships and the management of world affairs as we prepare for the era of the 21st century. (end text)
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